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				Rehnquist 
				
				
				Section I 
				
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				We begin, as we do in all due-process cases, by examining our 
				Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices. 
				
				  
				
				
				Protection and preservation of ALL human life 
				
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				The States' assisted-suicide bans are not innovations. Rather, 
				they are longstanding expressions of the States' commitment to 
				the protection and preservation of all human life. 
				
				  
				
				
				Focused on protecting dignity and independence at the end of 
				life 
				
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				Public concern and democratic action are therefore sharply 
				focused on how best to protect dignity and independence at the 
				end of life, with the result that there have been many 
				significant changes in state laws and in the attitudes these 
				laws reflect.  
				
				  
				
				
				Living Wills 
				
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				Many States, for example, now permit "living wills," surrogate 
				health-care decision making, and the withdrawal or refusal of 
				life-sustaining medical treatment.  
				
				  
				
				
				Legislators reaffirmed prohibitions on assisting suicide 
				
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				At the same time, however, voters and legislators continue for 
				the most part to reaffirm their States' prohibitions on 
				assisting suicide. 
				
				  
				
				
				Section II 
				
				  
				
				
				Substantive-due-process analysis two primary features 
				
				
				1.    
				
				
				First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause 
				specially protects 
				 
				
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				Those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively,  
				"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition, 
				and  
				
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				"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," such that "neither 
				liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed."
				 
				
				  
				
				
				2.    
				
				
				Second, we have required in substantive-due-process cases a "careful 
				description" of the 
				asserted fundamental liberty interest.  
				
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				Flores, Cruzan. 
				
				
				
				                                  i.   
				
				
				Our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices thus 
				provide the crucial "guideposts 
				for responsible decisionmaking," that 
				direct and restrain our 
				exposition of the Due Process Clause. 
				
				  
				
				  
				
				
				Analysis:  Whether this asserted right has any place in our 
				Nations traditions? 
				
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				Here we are confronted with a 
				consistent and almost universal 
				tradition that has long rejected the asserted right, 
				and continues explicitly to reject 
				it today, even for terminally ill, mentally competent 
				adults.  
				
				o   
				
				
				To hold for respondents, we 
				would have to reverse centuries of legal doctrine and 
				practice, and strike down the considered policy choice of almost 
				every State. 
				
				  
				
				
				Respondents contend - Consistent with substantive due process 
				line of cases 
				
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				The liberty interest they assert is consistent with this Court's 
				substantive-due-process line of cases, if not with this Nation's 
				history and practice.  
				
				  
				
				
				Respondents Point to Casey and Cruzan - General tradition of 
				self-sovereignty 
				
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				Pointing to Casey and Cruzan, respondents read our jurisprudence 
				in this area as reflecting a general tradition of 
				"self-sovereignty," and as teaching that the "liberty" protected 
				by the Due Process Clause includes "basic and intimate exercises 
				of personal autonomy. 
				
				
				Casey 
				
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				"It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of 
				personal liberty which the government may not enter.  
				
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				According to respondents,
				 
				
				§ 
				
				
				Our liberty jurisprudence, and the broad, individualistic 
				principles it reflects, protects the "liberty of competent, 
				terminally ill adults to make end-of-life decisions free of 
				undue government interference." 
				
				  
				
				
				Court 
				- Refusing medical treatment CANNOT be transmuted to assisting 
				in committing suicide 
				
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				The right assumed in Cruzan, however, was not simply deduced 
				from abstract concepts of personal autonomy.  
				
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				The decision to commit suicide with the assistance of another 
				may be just as personal and profound as the decision to refuse 
				unwanted medical treatment, but it has never enjoyed similar 
				legal protection.  
				
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				In Cruzan itself, we recognized that most States outlawed 
				assisted suicide--and even more do today--and 
				we certainly gave no intimation 
				that the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment could 
				be somehow transmuted into a right to assistance in committing 
				suicide. 
				
				  
				
				
				Court 
				- the right to assistance in committing suicide is not a 
				fundamental liberty interest 
				
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				The history of the law's treatment of assisted suicide in this 
				country has been and continues to be one of the rejection of 
				nearly all efforts to permit it.  
				
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				That being the case, our decisions lead us to conclude that the 
				asserted "right" to assistance 
				in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest 
				protected by the Due Process Clause.  
				
				  
				
				
				Rational Basis:  Rationally related to a legitimate government 
				interest 
				
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				The Constitution also requires, however, that Washington's 
				assisted-suicide ban be rationally related to legitimate 
				government interests.  
				
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				This requirement is unquestionably 
				met here 
				
				  
				
				
				Court 
				- Rational Basis Interests 
				
				
				1.    
				
				
				Washington has an "unqualified interest in the preservation of 
				human life."  
				
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				The ban against assisted suicide and euthanasia shores up the 
				notion of limits in human relationships. 
				
				
				2.    
				
				
				Interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical 
				profession. 
				
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				Time honored tradition between healing and harming. 
				
				
				3.    
				
				
				Interest in protecting vulnerable groups - including the poor, 
				the elderly, and disable persons - from abuse, neglect, and 
				mistake. 
				
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				The is a real risk of subtle coercion and undue influence in 
				end-of-life situations. 
				
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				The lives of the terminal ill and elderly must be no less valued 
				than lives of the young and healthy. 
				
				
				4.    
				
				
				Fear in permitting assisted suicide will start it down the path 
				to voluntary and perhaps even involuntary euthanasia. 
				
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				Netherlands allows euthanasia and sees a lot of cases. 
				
				  
				
				
				Court 
				- Holding 
				
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				Banning assisted suicide does NOT violate the Fourteenth 
				amendment. 
				
				  
				
				
				Concurring - Justice OConnor 
				
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				Whether a mentally competent person who is experiencing great 
				suffering has a constitutionally cognizable interest in 
				controlling the circumstances of his or her imminent death. 
				
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				Patient can obtain palliative [to reduce severity] care that 
				hastens their death. 
				
				  
				
				
				Concurring - Justice Stevens 
				
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				The Court holds that the Washington law is not invalid on its 
				face.  
				
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				However, it might be invalid in certain circumstances. 
				 
				
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				Specifically, it might be invalid with respect to an individual 
				who is not victimized by abuse, who is not suffering from 
				depression, and who makes a rational and voluntary decision to 
				seek assistance in dying. 
				
				  
				
				
				Concurring - Justice Souter 
				
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				Substantive due process evolves as competing interests evolve.
				 
				
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				The present case is like the abortion cases.  
				
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				The state has a legitimate interest in discouraging abortion, 
				but the Court has recognized a woman's right to a physician's 
				assistance in obtaining an abortion.  
				
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				The state interest that is dispositive to me is the state's 
				interest in protecting terminally ill patients from involuntary 
				suicide and voluntary and involuntary euthanasia.  
				
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				It is too difficult to draw the line between voluntary and 
				involuntary suicide.
				 
				
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				For example, family members might pressure a patient because of 
				the high costs of care or simply because they wish to see their 
				loved one's suffering end.  
				
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				Relying on physicians to make this determination is inadequate.
				 
				
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				Physicians may not know whether a patient is making a knowing 
				and voluntary choice.  
				
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				Also, physicians may not be acting purely objectively. 
				 
				
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				They may act out of compassion or under financial incentives.
				 
				
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				Glucksberg's proposal to rewrite the law sounds like the law in 
				the Netherlands.  
				
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				However, the evidence regarding the success of the Dutch system 
				is conflicting.  
				
				  
				
				
				Concurring - Justice Ginsburg 
				
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				Concurs for the same reasons as Justice OConnors 
				
				  
				
				
				Concurring - Justice Breyer 
				
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				A 
				law regarding the right to die with dignity might be upheld.
				 
				
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				However, I do not believe that the Court must decide whether 
				this right is fundamental.  
				
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				There is palliative care for a dying person who is suffering 
				from severe pain.  
				
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				If the law prevented such palliative care, the law's impact on 
				serious and unavoidable pain would be more at issue.  |